...in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a fundamental shift occurred in the legal assumptions about childhood, adulthood, and responsibility [p.1]... During the late sixteenth century, children became a metaphor for obedience and submission to church and kingdom... [but] political reformers of seventeenth-century England distinguished children's political identities from adults', emphasizing experience and reason as requirements for the exercise of political power. Their distinctions grew out of attempts to justify a form of government based on consent [p.2]... This paradigm shift, from authority based on birthright to authority based on reasoned consent, reconstituted the nature of legitimacy and power [p.5].One of the particularly interesting things for me is the questions it raises about what defines childhood: as I expected, we see some elitist politicians (e.g. John Adams) equating certain classes of adults (e.g. the propertyless) with children. What I also found interesting, though, is where Brewer's project differs from how I envisage mine. She ignores or tacitly refuses psychological implications, and builds her argument on corrolations and parallels between childhood issues and political issues.
A review on H-Net complains that "the connection between changing theories about civic authority and childhood often seems more theoretical and corollary than experiential and causal." I agree, Brewer shows that the two discourses seem to be connected but fails to find that connection. Surely it is psychological. At the very start, she touches on it: "On some level this image [of "children as metaphors for obedience"] transcended metaphor, became, in its pervasiveness, a structure through which many people understood their world [p.2]." But she doesn't follow this point up. The book would have benefited from a deeper theoretical appreciation of conceptual metaphor.
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